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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE: 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, MILLY O. BERNARD, 
Chairman, DAVID R. IRVINE 
and KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
Commissioners of the PUBLIC: 
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH,: 
and BRINKS, INC., 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16862 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petition of respondent, Brinks, Inc., (herein-
after referred to as Brinks) for a Certificate of Exemption 
from regulation by the Public Service Commission. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER TRIBUNAL 
The Public Service Commission (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Commission") granted respondent's 
Petition for Exemption. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks the Court to reverse and set 
aside the order of the .Commission. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There are no disputed facts involved. 
Procedurally, defendant Brinks, Inc. filed an application 
for a "certificate of exemption" with the Public Service 
Commission based upon its contention that Section 54-6-12 (f) 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, entitled it to statewide 
exemption from the provisions of the Motor Vehicle 
Transportation Act except for the requirements of insurance, 
safety regulations and accident reports. On January 25, 
1979, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the application 
for exemtpion contending that Section 54-6-12(f) exempted 
vehicles when constructed as armored cars and used for 
the safe conveyance or delivery of money or other 
valuables only when such vehicles were operating within 
a 15 mile radius of the limits of any city or town. 
Argument was had upon the application and the motion and 
on October 31, 1979, the Commission issued its report and 
order granting statewide exemption to applicant Brinks. 
It is that report and order which is the subject of this 
appeal. 
The single issue raised in this appeal is the 
proper construction of Section 54-6-12(£) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. The question specifically 
is whether the exemption contained in that section as it 
relates to armored cars is limited to operations within 
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a 15 mile radius of the limits of any city or town 
or whether the exemption is statewide. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 
54-6-12(f), LIMITS THE EXEMPTION 
TO MOTOR VEHICLES WHEN CONSTRUCTED 
AS ARMORED CARS AND USED FOR THE 
SAFE CONVEYANCE OR DELIVERY OF 
MONEY OR OTHER VALUABLES TO A 
15 MILE RADIUS OF THE LIMITS OF 
ANY CITY OR TOWN. 
As indicated in the Order of the Commission, 
appellant, Wells Fargo, applied for, and received from the 
Conunission, a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
authorizing it to operate as a common motor carrier 
transporting money and other articles of extraordinary 
value in armored cars between all points and places in 
the State of Utah (Report and Order Case No. 625B Sub 1, 
In the Matter of the Application of Wells Fargo Armored 
Service Corporation for a Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity to operate as a common motor carrier of property 
in intrastate commerce, P.S.C. Utah, November 7, 1974). 
Up until January of 1979 Brinks had been operating 
an armored car service within 15 miles of Salt Lake City 
without authority from the Commission relying upon the 
15 mile exemption in 54-6-12(f). 
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Section 54-6-12 U.C.A. provides in part: 
"54-6-12. Exceptions from provisions of 
act--Public liability and property damage policies--
Rules and regulations--Supervision of carriers 
excepted.-- Except for the provisions of 54-6-17 
relative to requirements of insurance, 54-6-21, relative 
to safety regulations, and 54-6-22 relative to accident 
report no portion of this act shall apply: 
(f) To motor vehicles when especially 
constructed for towing, wrecking, maintenance, 
or repair purposes, and not otherwise used in 
transporting goods and merchandise for compensation; 
or when constructed as armored cars and used 
for the safe conveyance or delivery of money or 
other valuables, or when used as hearses, 
ambulances, or licensed taxicabs, operating 
within a fifteen mile radius of the limits of 
any city or town; or to motor vehicles used 
as ambulances or hearses by any person, firm 
or corporation duly licensed in the state as 
an embalmer, funeral director, or as a mortuary 
establishment, provided that use of such motor 
vehicles as an ambulance shall be incidental 
to the use of embalming or funeral directing. [;or]" 
Rather than file an application for a 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 54-6-5 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, as did the appellant, 
Brinks opted to file an application for exemption 
from regulation as heretofore indicated. The granting 
-4-
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of the certificate of exemption to Brinks, put it, 
for the first time, in direct competition with Wells 
Fargo in its statewide operations pursuant to its 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1710. 
We respectfully submit that the armored car exemption 
in Section 54-6-12(f) is limited to the fifteen mile 
radius of any city or town as therein stated and 
that Section 54-6-5 U.C.A. sets forth the exclusive 
method of obtaining a Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity, namely, by filing an application therefor 
and proving that public convenience and necessity 
require the operation proposed. 
Section 54-6-4 U.C.A. gives the Commission 
the power and the duty to supervise and regulate all 
common motor carriers. In Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission, 13 U.2d 72, 368 P.2d 590 
(1962) this Court stated: 
"The Commission is required by 
statute to regulate so as to prevent 
unnecessary duplication of services in 
areas where the existing transportation 
service adequately meets the needs of 
the public." (Ci ting Section 54-6-4 
U.C.A. 1953, as· amended). 
-5-
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See also Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 572 P.2d 1368 (1977) 
in which case Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. attempted 
to obtain authority under the theory of an "alternate 
route" or a "route deviation" rather than by an 
application pursuant to Section 54-6-5 U.C.A. 
In that case this Court stated: 
"It is our opinion that if Uintah 
Freightways is to be granted the 
authority to haul freight directly 
from Salt Lake City to Price, it 
should be done in a forthright manner 
and by compliance with the requirements 
of U.C.A. 1953, Section 54-6-5, rather 
than to permit it to acquire such authority 
by the back-door method here employed. 
In view of the failure to so comply 
with the law, the order of the Commission 
granting such authority is vacated." 
Section 54-6-12(f) sets forth exemptions which 
are in derogation of the duty of the Commission to 
regulate as set forth in Section 54-6-4, supra. In 
Norville v. State Tax Commissioner, 98 Utah 170, 
97 P.2d 937 (1940) this Court held that statutes exempting 
taxpayers fr9m a general t~xing statute, being in derogation 
of the taxing power, are constrictly construed against 
those seeking to escape the tax burden. That theory is 
most applicable here. 
The Commission arrived at its conclusion 
that the exemption under consideration was statewide 
-6-
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by application of the so-called "last antecedent" rule 
of statutory construction. The Commission and the 
respondent, Brinks, overlooked the fact that by applying 
the "last antecedent" rule in the instant situation, the 
15 mile radius restriction would operate only to taxi 
cabs since "taxi cabs" is the last antecedent. However, 
the rationale of Brinks and the Commission clearly 
indicate that they concede that the limitation applies 
not only to taxi cabs but also to hearses and ambulances. 
Such a concession is necessary in applying the rule 
since the legislature has so construed the exemption. 
In 1951 the legislature added the last full phrase to 
paragraph (f) removing the 15 mile limitation from hearses 
and ambulances that are used incidental to the business 
of embalming or funeral directing. Obviously, the 
legislature was aware that the 15 mile radius at least 
applied to hearses and ambulances as well as to taxi cabs. 
Had it intended to remove the 15 mile limitation from 
armored cars, certainly that was the time to do so. 
Section 54-6-12 U.C.A. 1953 was enacted in 1935 and except 
for the amendment just described in 1951, sub section (f) 
has been intact to the present date. 
The Commission adopted the respondent Brinks' 
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argument that transportation of passengers and dead 
bodies somehow has an inherent difference, from a 
regulatory standpoint, than the transportation of money 
or other valuables for financial institutions. We 
respectfully submit that there is no rational basis 
whatever for such a conclusion. The Commission is 
charged with the regulation of all common carriers in 
the transportation of passengers and property. The 
Corn.mission states, in its Order: 
"Further, as pointed out by applicant 
in its Memorandum, the potential customers 
for applicant's specialized service are 
financial institutions in a strong 
bargaining position, vis-a-vis applicant. 
The need for regulation by this Commission 
would, accordingly, appear to be minimal. 
Regarding ambulances, hearses, and taxi 
cabs, the rationale for exemption would be 
that they frequently are the subject of 
regulation by local jurisdictions. The 
fifteen mile radius limitation thus makes 
more sense in their case than it would in 
the case of the armored car service." 
(Emphasis added) 
We fail to find any justification for this 
conclusion. The Commission has historically, on a regular 
basis, exercised its power and discharged its duty to 
regulate the transportation of all kinds of property. 
We fail to see any basis for the conclusion that there 
is a "minimal" need for regulation of motor vehicles used 
for the transportation, safe conveyance and delivery 
-8-
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of money or other valuables. On the contrary, it can be 
argued that carriers transporting such commodities need. 
more, not less, regulation than those carriers transporting 
less valuable commodities. 
In the case of Realty Purchasing Company v. 
Public Service Commission, 9 U.2d 375, 345 P.2d 606 (1959) 
the Court tacitly approved the grouping of the vehicles 
in paragraph (f) as all being limited to the 15 mile 
radius. The Court quoted from the statute as follows: 
"(f) * * * [wreckers] * * * [armored cars] 
* * * hearses, ambulances, or licensed taxi 
cabs, operating within a fifteen-mile 
radius of the limits of any city or town. * 
(Emphasis added) 
* *" 
Although the exact question of the application 
of the fifteen mile limitation was not in issue, the 
quotation of the statute as including wreckers and armored 
cars being subject to the 15 mile radius does indicate 
the Court's approval of such construction. 
In the case of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 
568 P.2d 738 (1977), the Court dealt with the "last 
antecedent" rule which applicant urges in support of its 
position. The Court refused to apply the rule in that 
particular case for the reason that strict application 
would have subverted the intent of the Legislature. 
-9-
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The Court stated on Page 741: 
"We have no doubt of the correctness 
of that rule of construction as a generality, 
if applied in appropriate circumstances. 
But helpful as rules of construction of ten 
are, they are useful guides~ but poor 
masters: and they should not be regarded 
as having any such rigidity as to have the 
force of law, or distort an otherwise 
natural meaning or intent. Their only 
legitimate function is to assist in 
ascertaining the true intent and purpose 
of the statute." 
The Court further recognizes the value in 
statutory construction of considering the fact that a 
statute has existed without change for a long time. 
On Page 741, the Court stated: 
"Nevertheless, we further observe that 
the correctness of the trial court's decision 
also finds support in this additional propositioo 
that in case of any uncertainty or ambiguity 
in a statute, a reasonable administrative 
interpretation and practice should be given 
some weight. And this is particularly true 
when such an administrative interpretation 
and practice has persisted for a long time 
without any legislative correction or change." 
Application of the "last antecedent" rule is 
improper here by reason of the punctuation employed by 
the Legislature. Not only did they fail to use a 
semi colon after the words "or other valuables" which 
would have clearly evidenced an intent to exclude armored 
cars from the limitation, but they employed the use of 
a comma after "taxi cabs" which shows an intent to 
relate the limitation to all preceding phrases. See 
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73 Am. Jur. 2d Sec. 231, P. 415 where it is stated: 
"The presence of a comma separating 
a modifying clause in a statute from 
the clause immediately preceding, is 
an indication that the modifying clause 
was intended to modify all the preceding 
clauses and not only the last antecedent one." 
In the case of Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission, 21 Utah 2d 377, 445 P.2d 990 
(1968) the Court expresses the value of statutory 
construction which allows the general purpose of the 
statute to be preserved without being changed by technical 
rules of statutory construction. The Court stated with 
respect to the rule of "expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius" which was urged upon it: 
"It has no force of law; and it has 
no proper application when its effect 
would be to obstruct rather than to 
carry out the purpose of the statute. 
It has been aptly said that it is 'a 
valuable servant, but a dangerous master.'" 
We respectfully submit that the proper 
interpretation of the statute is aptly and succinctly 
set forth by former Commissioner Kenneth Rigtrup in his 
dissent and we quote it in full: 
"I respectfully dissent: 
Had the Legislature intended the construction 
of Section 54-6-12(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
-11-
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arrived at by the majority of the Commission and as 
proposed by Applicant, such intention could have been 
made clear with the simple utilization of a semicolon 
in the following portion of subsection (f) : 
' ... or when constructed as armored 
cars and used for the safe conveyance 
or delivery of money or other valuables; 
or when used as hearses, ambulances, or-
licensed taxi cabs, operating within a 
fifteen mile radius of the limits of 
any city or town; ... '(Emphasis added) 
Without the use of such a semicolon, it appears to me that 
the statutory provision in question is extremely unclear 
and is susceptible of more than one interpretation. 
Given the vagueness and ambiguity involved, I would 
prefer not having to rely on a rule of construction to 
arrive at the appropriate result. 
In my view, reliance on and consistent 
application of a prior Commission interpretation of an 
unclear and ambiguious statute, assuming a rational 
basis therefor, provides a sounder basis for statutory 
construction than that relied on in this case. On 
April 5, 1974, Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation 
applied to this Commission for a certificate of convenience 
and necessity to operate as a common carrier for the 
transportation of money and other valuables in armored 
cars between all points and places in the State of Utah. 
Wells Fargo specifically acknowledged it had applied for 
-12-
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a certificate because it was unclear from the subject 
statute whether the fifteen mile limitation applied to 
armored cars, but did so 'in an abundance of caution to 
assure that future operations were strictly in accordance 
with the provision of the Utah Motor Carrier Act.' On 
November 7, 1974, in Case No. 6258 Sub 1, the Commission 
issued Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1710 
Sub 1, thus assuming jurisdictional regulatory 
responsibility over an armored motor carrier operating 
beyond a fifteen mile radius of a city or town. To 
conclude that the prior Commission did not weigh and 
consider whether its jurisdiction was properly invoked 
in the Wells Fargo case wherein the subject statute was 
specifically raised, though was not opposed directly in 
an adversary setting, gives our predecessor Commissioners 
absolutely no credit at all. I prefer giving them the 
benefit of the doubt. 
The general grant of jurisdictional authority 
of this Commission is set forth in Section 54-6-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides: 
"All common motor carriers of property 
or passengers as defined in this act 
are hereby declared to be common 
carriers within the meaning of the 
public utility laws of the state, 
and subject to this act and to the 
laws of this state. " 
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Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, carves out 
certain exemptions from the general regulatory jurisdiction, 
If there is some vagueness or ambiguity about a possible 
exemption, I would conclude that application of the 
general grant of authority is the sounder approach. 
Apparently, that is what the former Commission did in 
the Wells Fargo case, which I feel should be consistently 
applied by subsequent Commissions, there being no 
substantial reason being put forth as to why the original 
interpretation given the statute by the Commission was 
fatally flawed." 
Commissioner Rigtrup's construction is 
fully supported by and consistent with the courts holding 
in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, supra, that 
reasonable administrative interpretation should be 
given substantial weight. See also 73 Am. Jur. 2d 
Sec. 168 for the proposition that the construction of 
a statute by the administrative body charged with its 
execution should be followed unless there are compelling 
indications that it is wrong. Citing New York State 
Dept. of Social Services v. Dub lino, (US) 3 7 L. Ed. 2d 688, , 
93 S. Ct. 2507; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat. Committee, (US) 36 L. Ed. 2d 772, 93 
S. Ct. 2080. 
-14-
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CONCLUSION 
1. The Public Service Commission has the 
duty to regulate all common carriers. See Section 54-6-2 
and 54-6-4, U.C.A., 1953. 
2. The exemption contained in 54-6-12(f) 
is in derogation of that duty and must be strictly 
construed. 
3. Section 54-6-5 U.C.A. 1953, sets forth 
the exclusive procedure for obtaining a certificate of 
convenience and necessity. 
4. The fifteen mile limitation in Section 
54-6-12(f) has been contemporaneously construed as being 
applicable to all of the "motor vehicles" referred to in 
that section by the Public Service Commission itself, by 
acquiescence from the Legislature and by interpretation 
from this Honorable Court. 
5. The strained construction advocated by 
Brinks and adopted by the Commission resulting from the 
application of the "last antecedent" rule is improper. 
6. For all of these reasons the proper 
construction of Section 54-6-12(f) limits the exemption 
to motor vehicles when constructed as armored cars and 
used for the safe conveyance or delivery of money or 
other valuables to a fifteen mile radius of the limits 
of any city or town. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Armored 
Service Corporation respectfully prays that the Court 
vacate the Order of the Commission issuing a Certificate 
of Exemption to defendant Brinks, Inc~ 
-~~2-~ .. ?t.fully submJ.7 tted, ) . . ;/i ~ // , ., , / 
.,/, ~-· '1 / / / , ,·· --£ <'..--
- / - ~ ,.,, # - . - ./ "- -- _._/ ·-
Mark K. Boyle ~ / 
BOYLE & BOYLE 
10 W. Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE 
CORPORATION 
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